The long history of theorizing about perception—a history as long as the history of philosophy itself—divides into two quite distinct and irreconcilable camps, one that takes sensory experience to show us external reality just as it is, and one that takes such experience to reveal our own mind. Why we swing back and forth between these two extremes is something I hope to explain. Perhaps I might be forgiven for declining to take a position on which side in this oldest of philosophical debates has things right—but I mean to ask for no such forgiveness because in fact I am going to tell you which side is right: Neither one. Each position is wholly pathological. The first part of this essay diagnoses our long bipolar history and draws several lessons from it. The second part suggests that many current theories might still benefit from this diagnosis, inasmuch as they simply recapitulate the bipolar structure of these older debates. As therapy, I suggest we recognize that although perceptual experience is obviously indispensable to our lives, we ought not to suppose that the phenomenal character of that experience itself reveals anything about the nature of either mind or world.

中文翻译：

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对我们两极知觉历史的治疗性反思

关于知觉理论化的悠久历史——一段与哲学本身的历史一样长的历史——分为两个截然不同且不可调和的阵营，一个以感官经验向我们展示外部现实，另一类将这种经验用于揭示我们自己的想法。我希望解释为什么我们在这两个极端之间来回摆动。也许我拒绝在这场最古老的哲学辩论中站在哪一边是正确的立场可能是可以原谅的——但我的意思是不要求这样的原谅，因为事实上我要告诉你哪一边是正确的：都不是。每个位置都是完全病态的。本文的第一部分诊断了我们长期的两极分化历史，并从中吸取了一些教训。第二部分表明许多当前的理论可能仍然受益于这种诊断，因为它们只是简单地概括了这些旧辩论的两极结构。作为治疗，我建议我们认识到，虽然知觉体验显然对我们的生活是必不可少的，但我们不应该假设这种体验本身的现象特征揭示了关于心灵或世界本质的任何东西。