Morrison puts forth a view he calls “perceptual confidence,” defined as “the view that perceptual experiences assign degrees of confidence” (Morrison 2016). He contrasts this view with “postperceptual confidence,” which holds that degrees of confidence are assigned subsequent to perceptual experience. The question of the relation between perceptual experience and confidence is an important one, but the perceptual confidence view has a problem. Namely, degrees of confidence cannot be assigned to an experience; they can only be assigned to a decision outcome, and so cannot be a general attribute of perception. Perceptual uncertainty is not a new idea, but it is separate from and precedes determinations of confidence. Morrison’s approach, however, conflates uncertainty and confidence. Here, I raise concerns about the perceptual confidence view. I ask a series of questions about the scope of perceptual confidence, which I suggest is limited at best; discuss how Morrison’s construction of perceptual confidence conflicts with the scientific literature; and describe how sensory representations can underlie both uncertain perceptual experience and, only at a later stage, confidence. I propose that perceptual precision, not confidence, is a general approach for describing the uncertainty of perceptual experience.

中文翻译：

---

精确，而非信心，描述知觉体验的不确定性：评约翰·莫里森的“知觉信心”

莫里森提出了一种他称之为“知觉信心”的观点，定义为“知觉体验分配信心程度的观点”（Morrison 2016）。他将这种观点与“后知觉信心”进行了对比，后者认为信心的程度是在知觉体验之后分配的。感性经验与信心的关系问题是一个重要的问题，但感性信心观有问题。即，不能将置信度分配给体验；它们只能分配给决策结果，因此不能成为感知的一般属性。感知不确定性并不是一个新概念，但它与信心的确定是分开的，并先于确定。然而，莫里森的方法将不确定性和信心混为一谈。在这里，我提出了对感知信心观点的担忧。我问了一系列关于知觉信心范围的问题，我认为这充其量是有限的；讨论莫里森对知觉信心的构建如何与科学文献发生冲突；并描述感官表征如何成为不确定的知觉体验的基础，并且只有在后期才能成为信心的基础。我建议感知精确度，而不是置信度，是描述感知体验不确定性的一般方法。