List (2014, 2019) has recently argued for a particular view of free will as a higher-level phenomenon compatible with determinism. According to List, one could refute his account by showing that determinism at the physical level implies the impossibility of doing otherwise at the agential level. This paper takes up that challenge. Based on assumptions to which List's approach is committed, I provide a simple probabilistic model that establishes the connection between physical determinism and the impossibility of doing otherwise at the agential level that is needed to refute free will as a higher-level phenomenon.

中文翻译：

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自由意志是一种更高层次的现象吗？

List (2014, 2019) 最近主张将自由意志视为与决定论兼容的更高层次现象的特定观点。根据李斯特的说法，人们可以通过证明物理层面的决定论意味着在代理层面不可能做其他事情来反驳他的说法。本文接受了这一挑战。基于 List 的方法所承诺的假设，我提供了一个简单的概率模型，该模型建立了物理决定论和在代理级别上以其他方式做其他事情的不可能之间的联系，这是驳斥自由意志作为更高级别现象所需的。