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Subjective Unpossessed Reasons
Thought: A Journal of Philosophy Pub Date : 2018-11-12 , DOI: 10.1002/tht3.395
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A common assumption in contemporary debates about normative reasons is that ‘subjective' and ‘possessed' are two names for the same sort of reason. This paper challenges that assumption. Given our cognitive limitations, it is unsurprising that normative reasons that derive from what we know andreasons that weare in a position to use in our deliberation are not always one and the same.

中文翻译:

主观不具备的理由

当代关于规范性理由的辩论中的一个普遍假设是,“主观”和“拥有”是同一类理由的两个名称。本文挑战了这一假设。考虑到我们的认知局限性,源自我们所知道的东西的规范性理由和我们可以在审议中使用的理由并不总是相同的,这并不奇怪。
更新日期:2018-11-12
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