Abstract In this paper, I formulate a norm of intention consistency that is immune to the kind of cases that have been put forth to argue either that rationality does not require consistency between an agent's intentions, or that, if it does, then rationality is not normative. The norm I formulate mimics refinements that have been made to the norm of means‐end coherence in response to cases where, intuitively, you need not be irrational when you intend an end e, despite not intending the means m you believe to be necessary for e, because you do not believe that intending m is necessary for e. Similarly, according to the norm I put forth, if you intend e, and believe that e is inconsistent with e*, you need not be irrational if you also intend e*, as long as you do not believe that intending e* is inconsistent with e.

中文翻译：

---

意图一致性的另一种规范


摘要 在本文中，我制定了一种意图一致性规范，它不受已经提出的案例的影响，这些案例主张理性不需要代理人意图之间的一致性，或者如果需要一致性，那么理性就不是。规范的。我制定的规范模仿了对手段与目的连贯性规范所做的改进，以应对以下情况：直觉上，当您打算达到目的时，尽管您并不打算采用您认为必要的手段，但您不必非理性。 e，因为你不认为意图 m 对 e 来说是必要的。同样，根据我提出的规范，如果你意图e，并且认为e与e*不一致，那么如果你也意图e*，你不必是非理性的，只要你不认为意图e*不一致与 e。