Elizabeth Barnes and Robert Williams have developed a theory of metaphysical indeterminacy, via which they defend the theoretical legitimacy of vague objects. In this paper, we argue that while the Barnes-Williams theory supplies a viable account of genuine metaphysical vagueness, it cannot underwrite an account of genuinely vague objects. First we clarify the distinction between these two key theses. Then we argue that the Barnes-Williams theory of metaphysical vagueness not only fails to deliver genuinely vague objects, it in fact provides grounds for rejecting them.

中文翻译：

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没有模糊对象的形而上学模糊

伊丽莎白·巴恩斯 (Elizabeth Barnes) 和罗伯特·威廉姆斯 (Robert Williams) 发展了一种形而上学不确定性理论，通过该理论他们捍卫了模糊对象的理论合法性。在本文中，我们认为，虽然巴恩斯-威廉姆斯理论提供了对真正形而上学模糊性的可行解释，但它不能保证对真正模糊对象的解释。首先，我们澄清这两个关键论点之间的区别。然后我们争辩说，巴恩斯-威廉姆斯的形而上学模糊性理论不仅没有提供真正模糊的对象，而且实际上提供了拒绝它们的理由。