There is currently much discussion about how decision making should proceed when an agent’s degrees of belief are imprecise; represented by a set of probability functions. I show that decision rules recently discussed by Sarah Moss, Susanna Rinard and Rohan Sud all suffer from the same defect: they all struggle to rationalise diachronic ambiguity aversion. Since ambiguity aversion is among the motivations for imprecise credence, this suggests that the search for an adequate imprecise decision rule is not yet over.

中文翻译：

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三种不精确决策理论的反例

目前有很多关于当代理人的信念程度不准确时应该如何进行决策的讨论；由一组概率函数表示。我展示了 Sarah Moss、Susanna Rinard 和 Rohan Sud 最近讨论的决策规则都存在同样的缺陷：他们都努力将历时歧义厌恶合理化。由于歧义厌恶是不精确信任的动机之一，这表明对适当的不精确决策规则的探索尚未结束。