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Free Speech as a Special Right
Philosophy & Public Affairs ( IF 3.3 ) Pub Date : 2017-03-01 , DOI: 10.1111/papa.12087
Leslie Kendrick

Many theorists treat free speech as a special right. Other theorists argue that, in order for free speech to be important, it must be a special right, but they conclude that it is not. What the term “special right” means in these contexts, however, remains elusive. The term usually suggests that the right in question is distinguishable from the usual governmental decision making processes and from other rights. But just how distinctive the right must be, and in what ways, is rarely defined clearly. Indeed, many discussions of free speech assume quite demanding criteria for a special right of freedom of speech, even as these criteria remain incompletely articulated. This paper seeks to define the criteria for a special right. It argues that the idea of a special right actually conceals two separate requirements. First, a special right must be distinct, in that the activities covered by the right must be analytically distinguishable from the activities outside of it. Second, a special right must be robust in the protection it affords. Most theories demand that a free speech right be highly distinctive, if not singular, and that it receive highly robust protection. By contrast, this paper posits that distinctiveness is a requirement of a special right only to a minimal extent and robustness, as commonly understood, not at all. On the revised criteria offered here, it seems possible that speech may after all be special, though the free speech right we want may be different from the one we can have.

中文翻译:

言论自由作为一项特殊权利

许多理论家将言论自由视为一项特殊权利。其他理论家认为,为了使言论自由重要,它必须是一项特殊权利,但他们得出的结论是,事实并非如此。然而,“特殊权利”一词在这些情况下的含义仍然难以捉摸。该术语通常表示相关权利与通常的政府决策过程和其他权利不同。但是,权利必须有多么独特,以何种方式,很少有明确的定义。事实上,许多关于言论自由的讨论都假设了一项特殊的言论自由权的非常苛刻的标准,即使这些标准仍未完全阐明。本文旨在界定一项特殊权利的标准。它认为特殊权利的概念实际上隐藏了两个独立的要求。第一的,一项特殊权利必须是不同的,因为该权利所涵盖的活动必须在分析上与该权利之外的活动区分开来。其次,一项特殊权利必须在其提供的保护方面具有强大的力量。大多数理论要求言论自由权即使不是单一的,也必须具有高度的独特性,并且受到高度有力的保护。相比之下,本文认为显着性是一项特殊权利的要求,只是在最小程度上和稳健性,正如通常理解的那样,根本不是。根据此处提供的修订标准,言论可能毕竟是特殊的,尽管我们想要的言论自由权可能与我们可以拥有的不同。一项特殊权利在其提供的保护方面必须是强有力的。大多数理论要求言论自由权即使不是单一的,也必须具有高度的独特性,并且受到高度有力的保护。相比之下,本文认为显着性是一项特殊权利的要求,只是在最小程度上和稳健性,正如通常理解的那样,根本不是。根据此处提供的修订标准,尽管我们想要的言论自由权可能与我们可以拥有的言论自由权不同,但言论毕竟可能是特殊的,这似乎是可能的。一项特殊权利在其提供的保护方面必须是强有力的。大多数理论要求言论自由权即使不是单一的,也必须具有高度的独特性,并且受到高度有力的保护。相比之下,本文认为显着性是一项特殊权利的要求,只是在最小程度上和稳健性,正如通常理解的那样,根本不是。根据此处提供的修订标准,言论可能毕竟是特殊的,尽管我们想要的言论自由权可能与我们可以拥有的不同。
更新日期:2017-03-01
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