当前位置: X-MOL 学术Philosophy & Public Affairs › 论文详情
Our official English website, www.x-mol.net, welcomes your feedback! (Note: you will need to create a separate account there.)
On the Moral Objection to Coercion
Philosophy & Public Affairs ( IF 2.200 ) Pub Date : 2017-06-01 , DOI: 10.1111/papa.12098
Stephen J. White

Suppose Green threatens Brown: “Stay out of Malibu, or you’ll be sorry.” And Brown has every reason to believe he will indeed be sorry if he shows up in Malibu again. And so Brown stays out of Malibu. Most of us will think that, prima facie, Green has done something wrong. There is perhaps some background we could fill in that would make it permissible for Green to issue the threat. But in the absence of some special justification, this type of coercion is objectionable. But what exactly has Green done to Brown, so far, that one might object to? Of course, it would be wrong for Green to carry out her threat and, say, beat up Brown. But Green hasn’t done that yet and, in fact, won’t do that, because Brown, we can suppose, will stay out of Malibu. In the literature on the topic, we find an interesting divergence of emphasis. Different accounts focus attention on different aspects of

中文翻译:

论对强制的道德反对

假设格林威胁布朗:“远离马里布,否则你会后悔的。” 布朗有充分的理由相信,如果他再次出现在马里布,他确实会感到抱歉。所以布朗远离马里布。我们大多数人会认为,表面上看,格林做错了什么。也许我们可以填写一些背景信息,让格林可以发布威胁。但在没有特殊理由的情况下,这种强制手段是令人反感的。但到目前为止,格林究竟对布朗做了什么,人们可能会反对?当然,格林实施她的威胁并例如殴打布朗是错误的。但是格林还没有那样做,事实上,他也不会那样做,因为我们可以假设布朗会远离马里布。在有关该主题的文献中,我们发现了一个有趣的侧重点分歧。
更新日期:2017-06-01
down
wechat
bug