Helen Nissenbaum's doctrine of contextual integrity has won extraordinary attention as a standard for acceptability in the flow of personal information. It promises to distinguish between forms of disclosure that are ethically justified and others, based on the social relationships and purposes of the settings in which they occur. The attraction of any analytical system that could accomplish such results is obvious, but this article holds that Nissenbaum's claims are not fulfilled. Notions that norms underlying any given domain of human conduct are unambiguous or uncontested simply do not withstand close examination. Indeed, most social norms, particularly in rapidly changing domains of human conduct like privacy practices, are volatile and highly contested. Many different interpretations of the “correct” norms are possible for any given context, and thinkers are always inclined to embrace those interpretations that most closely fit their pre‐existing mind‐sets and value positions. This flexibility has helped make the doctrine enormously attractive to policymakers seeking to defuse conflicts between proponents of new uses of personal information and privacy advocates. But it has hardly yielded unambiguous policy prescriptions that all parties could agree on.

中文翻译：

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语境完整性及其不满：对海伦·尼森鲍姆（Helen Nissenbaum）的规范论证的批判

海伦·尼森鲍姆（Helen Nissenbaum）的语境完整性学说作为个人信息流中可接受性的标准而受到了极大的关注。它承诺根据社会关系和发生环境的目的，在道德上合理的披露形式与其他形式进行区分。任何可以完成此类结果的分析系统都具有明显的吸引力，但本文认为，尼森鲍姆的主张没有得到满足。有关人类行为的任何给定领域的规范是明确的或无争议的，这些观点根本无法经受严密的考验。确实，大多数社会规范，尤其是在诸如隐私惯例之类的人类行为迅速变化的领域中，都是易变的，并且竞争激烈。在任何给定的背景下，对“正确”规范的许多不同解释都是可能的，思想家们总是倾向于接受最符合其既有思维定势和价值立场的那些解释。这种灵活性使该学说对寻求缓解个人信息新用途的支持者与隐私权倡导者之间的冲突的决策者具有极大的吸引力。但这几乎没有产生各方都能同意的明确政策规定。