Perceiving things to be a certain way may in some cases lead directly to action that is intelligent (e.g., skillful, wise, clever, astute). This phenomenon has not often been discussed, though it is of broad philosophical interest. It also raises a difficult question: how can perception produce intelligent action? After clarifying the question—which I call the question of “practical perception”—and explaining what is required for an adequate answer, I critically examine two candidate answers drawn from work on related topics: the first, inspired by Hubert Dreyfus's phenomenological analysis of absorbed coping (and of a piece with James Gibson's theory of affordances), focuses on awareness of situational features; the other, suggested by Gilbert Ryle's classic treatment of knowledge-how, focuses on possession of behavioral dispositions. I argue that neither approach is adequate. Subsequently, I develop and defend an alternative answer that emphasizes the agent's conceptual understanding.

中文翻译：

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实用感知与智能行动

在某些情况下，以某种方式感知事物可能会直接导致明智的行动（例如，熟练、明智、聪明、机敏）。这种现象虽然具有广泛的哲学意义，但并未经常被讨论。它还提出了一个难题：感知如何产生智能动作？在澄清了这个问题——我称之为“实践感知”的问题——并解释了充分回答所需的条件之后，我批判性地检查了从相关主题工作中得出的两个候选答案：第一个，受到休伯特·德雷福斯对吸收的现象学分析的启发。应对（以及詹姆斯吉布森的可供性理论的一篇文章），侧重于对情境特征的认识；另一个，由吉尔伯特·赖尔（Gilbert Ryle）对知识的经典处理所建议的，侧重于行为倾向的拥有。我认为这两种方法都不合适。随后，我开发并捍卫了一个强调代理概念理解的替代答案。