It may seem that when you have an emotional response to a perceived object or event that makes it seem to you that the perceived source of the emotion possesses some evaluative property, then you thereby have prima facie, immediate justification for believing that the object or event possesses the evaluative property. Call this view ‘dogmatism about emotional justification’. We defend a view of the structure of emotional awareness according to which the objects of emotional awareness are derived from other experiences such as bodily sensation, inner awareness, sensory perception, memory, and imagination. On this basis, we argue that dogmatism about emotional justification is an untenable position, regardless of whether the special feature of an immediate justifier that makes it an immediate justifier is its presentational phenomenology or its evidence insensitivity.

中文翻译：

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反对情绪教条主义

似乎当你对感知到的对象或事件有情绪反应，使你觉得情绪的感知来源具有某种评价属性时，那么你就有初步的、直接的理由相信该对象或事件具有评价属性。称这种观点为“关于情感辩护的教条主义”。我们捍卫情绪意识结构的观点，根据这种观点，情绪意识的对象来自其他经验，如身体感觉、内在意识、感官知觉、记忆和想象。在此基础上，我们认为关于情感辩护的教条主义是站不住脚的，