When in the business of offering an account of the epistemic normativity of belief, one is faced with the following dilemma: strongly externalist norms fail to account for the intuition of justification in radical deception scenarios, while milder norms are incapable to explain what is epistemically wrong with false beliefs. This paper has two main aims; we first look at one way out of the dilemma, defended by Timothy Williamson and Clayton Littlejohn, and argue that it fails. Second, we identify what we take to be the problematic assumption that underlies their account and offer an alternative way out. We put forth a knowledge-first friendly normative framework for belief which grants justification to radically deceived subjects while at the same time acknowledging that their false beliefs are not epistemically good beliefs.

中文翻译：

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信仰规范

在对信念的认知规范性进行解释时，人们面临以下两难境地：强烈的外在主义规范无法解释激进的欺骗场景中的正当性直觉，而较温和的规范无法解释什么是认知错误带着错误的信念。本文有两个主要目的；我们首先看看一种摆脱困境的方法，由 Timothy Williamson 和 Clayton Littlejohn 辩护，并认为它失败了。其次，我们确定了我们认为是他们帐户基础的有问题的假设，并提供了替代的出路。我们提出了一个以知识为先的、友好的信念规范框架，它为被彻底欺骗的主体提供了辩护，同时承认他们的错误信念在认知上并不是好的信念。