Most people think of themselves as pretty good at understanding others’ beliefs, desires, emotions, and intentions. Accurate mindreading is an impressive cognitive feat, and for this reason the philosophical literature on mindreading has focused exclusively on explaining such successes. However, as it turns out, we regularly make mindreading mistakes. Understanding when and how mind misreading occurs is crucial for a complete account of mindreading. In this paper, I examine the conditions under which mind misreading occurs. I argue that these patterns of mind misreading shed light on the limits of mindreading, reveal new perspectives on how mindreading works, and have implications for social epistemology.

中文翻译：

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心灵误读

大多数人认为自己非常善于理解他人的信念，欲望，情感和意图。准确的心智阅读是一项令人印象深刻的认知壮举，因此，有关心智阅读的哲学文献只专注于解释这种成功。但是，事实证明，我们经常会犯一些令人误解的错误。了解何时发生误读以及如何发生误读对于完整地理解思维至关重要。在本文中，我研究了导致误读的条件。我认为，这些心智误读模式揭示了心识的局限性，揭示了心识工作原理的新观点，并对社会认识论产生了影响。