Phenomenal character (or feel) is the what‐it's‐likeness of subjective experience. I develop an ontology of phenomenal feel as process. My being in some phenomenal state R is the process of my instantiating R’s neurological correlate. The ontology explains why we have asymmetric epistemic access to phenomenal characters: the ontological ground for the subjective or first‐personal stance is different from the ontological ground for the objective or third‐personal stance. I end by situating my account in debates about physicalism.

中文翻译：

---

现象感过程1

现象特征（或感觉）是主观体验的本质。我发展了一种现象感觉作为过程的本体。我处于某种特殊的状态R是实例化R的神经相关性的过程。本体论解释了为什么我们对现象特征具有非对称的认知途径：主观或第一人称立场的本体论基础与客观或第三人称立场的本体论基础不同。最后，我将论点放在有关物理主义的辩论中。