This paper looks at three ways of addressing probabilism's implausible requirement of logical omniscience. The first and most common strategy says it's okay to require an ideally rational person to be logically omniscient. I argue that this view is indefensible on any interpretation of ‘ideally rational’. The second strategy says probabilism should be formulated not in terms of logically possible worlds but in terms of doxastically possible worlds, ways you think the world might be. I argue that, on the interpretation of this approach that lifts the requirement of certainty in all logical truths, the view becomes vacuous, issuing no requirements on rational believers at all. Finally, I develop and endorse a new solution to the problem. This view proposes dynamic norms for reasoning with credences. The solution is based on an old proposal of Ian Hacking's that says you're required to be sensitive to logical facts only when you know they are logical facts.

中文翻译：

---

解决逻辑无所不能的问题

本文着眼于解决概率论对逻辑全能学的难以置信的要求的三种方式。第一个也是最常见的策略是，可以要求理想的理性人在逻辑上无所不知。我认为，这种观点在对“理想理性”的任何解释上都是无可辩驳的。第二个策略说或然率不应该在逻辑上可能的世界方面，而且在以下方面制定doxastically可能的世界，您认为世界可能的方式。我认为，在对这种在所有逻辑真理中都增加确定性要求的方法的解释上，观点变得空虚，根本不对理性的信徒发出要求。最后，我开发并认可了该问题的新解决方案。这种观点提出了具有可信度的推理动态准则。该解决方案基于Ian Hacking的旧建议，即要求您仅在知道逻辑事实时才对逻辑事实敏感。