I argue that a general logic of definitions must tolerate ω‐inconsistency. I present a semantical scheme, , under which some definitions imply ω‐inconsistent sets of sentences. I draw attention to attractive features of this scheme, and I argue that yields the minimal general logic of definitions. I conclude that any acceptable general logic should permit definitions that generate ω‐inconsistency. This conclusion gains support from the application of to the theory of truth.

中文翻译：

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推论定义了Ω不一致的定义逻辑

我认为定义的一般逻辑必须容忍ω-不一致。我提出了一种语义方案，根据该方案，一些定义隐含了ω-不一致的句子集。我提请注意此方案的吸引人的功能，并认为这产生了定义的最低限度的一般逻辑。我得出结论，任何可接受的通用逻辑都应允许产生ω-不一致的定义。这一结论得到了将真理应用于理论的支持。