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Knowledge, safety, and Gettierized lottery cases: Why mere statistical evidence is not a (safe) source of knowledge
Philosophical Issues ( IF 0.6 ) Pub Date : 2019-09-18 , DOI: 10.1111/phis.12139
Fernando Broncano‐Berrocal 1
Affiliation  

The lottery problem is the problem of explaining why mere reflection on the long odds that one will lose the lottery does not yield knowledge that one will lose. More generally, it is the problem of explaining why true beliefs merely formed on the basis of statistical evidence do not amount to knowledge. Some have thought that the lottery problem can be solved by appeal to a violation of the safety principle for knowledge, i.e., the principle that if S knows that p, not easily would S have believed that p without p being the case. Against the standard safety‐based solution, I argue that understanding safe belief as belief that directly covaries with the truth of what is believed in a suitably defined set of possible worlds forces safety theorists to make a series of theoretical choices that ultimately prevent a satisfactory solution to the problem. In this way, I analyze several safety principles that result from such choices—the paper thus gives valuable insights into the nature of safety—and explain why none solves the lottery problem, including their inability to explain away Gettierized lottery cases. On a more positive note, I show that there is a viable solution in terms of safety if we get rid of the unquestioned assumption that safe beliefs directly track the truth. The alternative is a conception of safe belief according to which what safe beliefs directly track is the appropriateness of the circumstances and, indirectly, the truth. The resulting safety principle, I argue, explains why mere statistical evidence is not a safe source of knowledge.

中文翻译:

知识,安全和分层彩票案例:为什么仅统计证据不是知识的(安全)来源

彩票问题是这样一个问题,即解释为什么仅对一个人将失去彩票的长赔率进行反思就不会产生一个人将失去的知识的问题。更笼统地说,这是解释为什么仅基于统计证据形成的真实信念不等于知识的问题。有些人认为,彩票问题可以通过申诉来解决违反的知识,即原则,安全原则,即如果小号知道p,不会轻易将小号一直认为,pp确实如此。反对基于标准安全性的解决方案,我认为将安全信念理解为直接与适当定义的可能世界中的信念的事实共变的信念会迫使安全理论家做出一系列理论选择,最终导致无法达成令人满意的解决方案解决问题。通过这种方式,我分析了从这些选择中得出的几种安全原则(因此,本文对安全的本质提供了宝贵的见解),并解释了为什么没有一种解决彩票问题的原因,包括它们无法解释Gettierized彩票案件。从更积极的角度来看,如果我们摆脱毫无疑问的安全信念直接追踪真相的假设,那么我将在安全性方面找到可行的解决方案。另一种选择是安全信念的概念,根据该概念,安全信念直接跟踪的是环境的适当性,以及间接的真实性。我认为,由此产生的安全原则解释了为什么仅仅统计证据不是安全的知识来源。
更新日期:2019-09-18
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