Some psychological states—paradigmatically, beliefs and intentions—are rationally evaluable: they can be rational or irrational, justified or unjustified. Other states—e.g. sensations and gastrointestinal states—aren't: they're a‐rational. On a familiar but hard‐to‐make‐precise line of thought, at least part of what explains this difference is that we're somehow responsible for (having/being in) states of the former sort, in a way we're not for the others. But this responsibility can't be modeled on the responsibility we have for our (free, intentional) actions. So how should it be understood? In this paper I address that question. The overall shape of my answer is in line with tradition: I take the responsibility to be grounded in certain capacities for reflection and control. Answers in this family have recently been subjected to an interesting challenge. But the version I defend meets that challenge.

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关于基本责任

某些心理状态-范式上的信念和意图-是可以合理评估的：它们可以是理性的或非理性的，合理的或不合理的。其他状态（例如感觉和胃肠道状态）则没有：它们是理性的。按照熟悉但难以精确的思路，至少可以解释此差异的部分原因是，我们以某种方式负责（拥有/进入）前一种状态，而我们并非为其他人。但是，这种责任不能以我们对（自由，故意）行动所承担的责任为蓝本。那么应该如何理解呢？在本文中，我解决了这个问题。我的回答总体上与传统相符：我有责任以一定的思考和反思能力为基础控制。这个家庭的答案最近受到了一个有趣的挑战。但是我捍卫的版本可以应对这一挑战。