Are epistemic reasons normative in the same sense as, for instance, moral reasons? In this paper I examine and defend the claim that epistemic reasons are normative only relative to an epistemic standard. Unlike moral reasons they are not substantially normative, because they fail to make an independent contribution to obligations or permissions simpliciter. After presenting what I take to be the main argument for this view, I illustrate that the argument has often been defended by examples which controversially presuppose strong epistemic obligations or pragmatic reasons for belief. Opponents of the argument often deny the existence of obligations and reasons of these kinds. I therefore examine whether the argument can withstand that line of critique by employing new examples.

中文翻译：

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认知原因会影响应该的简化吗？

认知原因是否与道德原因具有相同的规范意义？在本文中，我检验和辩护了这样一种说法，即认知原因仅相对于认知标准而言是规范性的。与道德原因不同，它们不是实质性的规范，因为它们未能对义务或权限简化者做出独立的贡献。在介绍了我认为该观点的主要论点之后，我举例说明了该论点经常被有争议的例子所辩护，这些例子都以强烈的认识论义务或信仰的务实理由为前提。反对者常常否认存在这种义务和原因。因此，我通过采用新的例子来检验该论点是否可以承受这种批评。