This paper studies demand information sharing in a two-echelon supply chain consisting of one manufacturer and two retailers, an informed retailer and an uninformed retailer. The retailers engage in Cournot competition or Bertrand competition. The manufacturer can conduct cost reduction, while the informed retailer has the decision power to opt for a sharing format, among no sharing, partial sharing (only with the manufacturer), and full sharing. Under partial sharing, the uninformed retailer infers the demand information from the manufacturer's wholesale price. We find that the inference effect, that is, the presence of the manufacturer's pricing distortion, depends on the manufacturer's cost-reduction efficiency and the retailers' competition mode. Under low cost-reduction efficiency, the inference effect makes the retailers worse off in quantity competition, whereas it is beneficial to them in price competition. On the contrary, under high efficiency, the retailers benefit from the inference effect in quantity competition, whereas they become worse off in price competition. By contrast, the inference effect only makes the manufacturer worse off. The uninformed retailer may prefer partial sharing to full sharing, while the informed retailer may be indifferent between full sharing and partial sharing.

中文翻译：

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下游竞争的供应链中生产成本降低驱动的信息共享

本文研究了由一个制造商和两个零售商、一个知情零售商和一个不知情零售商组成的两级供应链中的需求信息共享。零售商参与古诺竞争或伯特兰竞争。制造商可以进行成本降低，而知情零售商有选择共享形式的决定权，包括不共享、部分共享（仅与制造商共享）和完全共享。在部分共享下，不知情的零售商从制造商的批发价格推断需求信息。我们发现推理效果，即制造商定价扭曲的存在，取决于制造商的降本效率和零售商的竞争模式。在成本降低效率较低的情况下，推理效应使零售商在数量竞争中的处境更糟，而在价格竞争中对他们有利。相反，在高效率下，零售商在数量竞争中受益于推理效应，而在价格竞争中则变得更糟。相比之下，推理效果只会让制造商的处境变得更糟。不知情的零售商可能更喜欢部分共享而不是完全共享，而知情零售商可能对完全共享和部分共享无动于衷。