This paper analyzes a novel selling strategy for airlines, termed flight crowdfunding, whereby an airline, as a creator, launches flights to solicit funds from the crowd. Under this strategy, the project succeeds if the total amount pledged reaches a predetermined threshold by the end of the campaign; otherwise, the flight will be canceled. We provide an implementable model to describe the process of flight crowdfunding and explain the behavior of strategic consumers. First, we find that crowdfunding is strictly optimal for airlines in a competitive market, although perhaps not in a monopoly market. Crowdfunding benefits airlines by reducing their expected cost and introducing a new type of buyer uncertainty, that is, uncertainty in the projects' success probability. Second, we show that the optimal threshold is lower than the indifferent point. Third, a counterintuitive finding is that crowdfunding may increase the equilibrium price in a monopoly market. Our research underscores the importance of crowdfunding and shows that crowdfunding may be even more attractive than what was previously thought. Crowdfunding can also improve airlines' profits as a revenue management strategy and benefit social welfare by reducing greenhouse gas emissions.

中文翻译：

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航班众筹中的定价策略和活动设计：一种创造性的机票销售方式

本文分析了航空公司的一种新颖的销售策略，称为航班众筹，即航空公司作为创造者，推出航班以从人群中募集资金。在此策略下，如果在活动结束时承诺的总金额达到预定阈值，则项目成功；否则，航班将被取消。我们提供了一个可实施的模型来描述飞行众筹的过程并解释战略消费者的行为。首先，我们发现众筹对于竞争市场中的航空公司来说是严格最优的，尽管可能不是在垄断市场中。众筹通过降低航空公司的预期成本和引入一种新型的买方不确定性，即项目成功概率的不确定性，使航空公司受益。第二，我们表明最优阈值低于无差异点。第三，一个违反直觉的发现是众筹可能会提高垄断市场的均衡价格。我们的研究强调了众筹的重要性，并表明众筹可能比以前想象的更有吸引力。众筹还可以作为一种收入管理策略来提高航空公司的利润，并通过减少温室气体排放来造福社会。