How we evaluate things and what we desire are closely connected. In typical cases, the things we desire are things that we evaluate as good or desirable. According to evaluation theories of desire, this connection is a very tight one: desires are evaluations of their objects as good or as desirable.¹ There are two main varieties of this view. According to Doxastic Evaluativism, to desire that p is to believe or judge that p is good.² According to Perceptual Evaluativism, to desire that p is to perceive p as being good (or for p to seem good).³ The present paper poses a puzzle for such views. The puzzle should be familiar to theorists interested in the normativity and metaphysics of the emotions, but I am unaware of its application to desire⁴ The aim of the present paper is to present the puzzle as it applies to desire, which should be of independent interest, but I also hope that by shining a light on the puzzle in this domain, we might put ourselves in a better position to offer a solution in all cases. At the end of the paper, I gesture towards a promising way ahead that departs from relying on contradictory contents.

中文翻译：

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欲望评价理论之谜

我们如何评价事物和我们想要什么是密切相关的。在典型的情况下，我们想要的东西是我们评估为好的或可取的东西。根据欲望的评价理论，这种联系是非常紧密的：欲望是对其对象的好坏的评价。¹这种观点有两种主要形式。根据 Doxastic 评价主义，渴望 p 就是相信或判断p 是好的。²根据感知Evaluativism，渴望p是对感知数p作为是好的（或p来似乎好）。³本文对这些观点提出了一个难题。对情绪的规范性和形而上学感兴趣的理论家应该熟悉这个谜题，但我不知道它对欲望的应用^{4 本文}的目的是呈现这个谜题，因为它适用于欲望，这应该是独立的兴趣，但我也希望通过阐明这个领域的难题，我们可以让自己处于更好的位置，在所有情况下提供解决方案。在论文的最后，我指出了一条有希望的前进道路，而不是依赖于相互矛盾的内容。