Leibniz is unclear about the nature of pleasure. In some texts, he describes pleasure as a perception of perfection, while in other texts he describes pleasure as being caused by a perception of perfection. In this article, I disambiguate two senses of “perception of perfection”, which clarifies Leibniz's considered position. I argue that pleasure is a perception of an increase in a substance's power which is caused by a substance's knowledge of a perfection of the universe or God. This reading helps clarify the nature of Leibnizian happiness. Happiness is a cognitive process (akin to a mood), constituted fundamentally out of pleasure, which is grounded in increases in a substance's power. A rational substance will sustain its happiness so long as it is more powerful than it is weak, and it is engaging in activities that increase its power.

中文翻译：

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莱布尼茨论智力愉悦、完美感和权力

莱布尼茨不清楚快乐的本质。在一些文章中，他描述的快感作为知觉的完美，而在其他文字描述他的快乐所引起的完美的感觉。在这篇文章中，我消除了“完美感”的两种含义，阐明了莱布尼茨的深思熟虑的立场。我认为，快乐是的看法增加物质“的权力是由一种物质造成一个完美的知识宇宙或上帝。这种解读有助于阐明莱布尼茨式幸福的本质。幸福是一个认知过程（类似于心情)，从根本上是由快乐构成的，快乐是基于物质力量的增加。一个理性的实体，只要它的力量大于它的弱点，它就会维持它的幸福，并且它正在从事增加其力量的活动。