Eriksson thinks that moral disagreements are intuitively faulty whereas disagreements about taste are intuitively faultless. He attempts to account for this difference by arguing, first, that moral judgements and taste judgements differ with regard to the presence of a disposition to challenge conflicting judgements and, second, that the intuition that a judgement is mistaken consists in the disposition to challenge it. In this article, I focus on the reasons given to support the first claim and argue that they are not sufficient. First, I assess the thesis that a taste judgement is only contingently connected with a disposition to challenge conflicting judgements. Second, I focus on the claim that a moral judgement is in part a disposition to challenge conflicting judgements. In both cases, I argue that the reasons given fail to disclose any substantial difference between the two domains.

中文翻译：

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分歧与冲突：道德和品味判断如何不不同

埃里克森认为道德上的分歧在直觉上是错误的，而关于品味的分歧在直觉上是无懈可击的。他试图通过以下论证来解释这种差异：首先，道德判断和品味判断在挑战相互冲突判断的倾向方面存在差异，其次，判断错误的直觉在于挑战它的倾向。 . 在这篇文章中，我将重点放在支持第一个主张的理由上，并认为这些理由是不够的。首先，我评估了以下论点：品味判断仅与挑战相互冲突的判断的倾向偶然相关。其次，我关注这样一种说法，即道德判断在一定程度上是一种挑战相互矛盾判断的倾向。在这两种情况下，