False beliefs and misleading evidence have striking similarities. In many regards, they are both epistemically bad or undesirable. Yet some epistemologists think that, while one's evidence is normative (i.e., one's available evidence affects the doxastic states one is epistemically permitted or required to have), one's false beliefs cannot be evidence and cannot be normative. They have offered various motivations for treating false beliefs differently from true misleading beliefs, and holding that only the latter may be evidence. I argue that this is puzzling: if misleading evidence and false beliefs share so many important similarities, why treat them differently? I also argue that, given the striking similarities between false beliefs and misleading evidence, many arguments for the factivity of evidence overgeneralize. That is, if these arguments were conclusive, they would also entail that the evidence cannot be misleading. But this is an overgeneralization, since the evidence can be misleading.

中文翻译：

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错误信念和误导性证据

错误信念和误导性证据有着惊人的相似之处。在许多方面，它们在认知上都是坏的或不可取的。然而，一些认识论者认为，虽然一个人的证据是规范的（即，一个人的可用证据会影响一个人在认识上被允许或要求拥有的信念状态），但一个人的错误信念不能成为证据，也不能成为规范。他们提供了各种动机来区别对待错误信念和真正误导性信念，并认为只有后者才可能是证据。我认为这令人费解：如果误导性证据和错误信念有这么多重要的相似之处，为什么要区别对待它们呢？我还认为，鉴于错误信念和误导性证据之间惊人的相似性，许多关于证据真实性的论点过于笼统。那是，如果这些论点是决定性的，它们也意味着证据不能具有误导性。但这是一种过度概括，因为证据可能具有误导性。