Both philosophers of perception and analytic metaphysicians apply the tropes/universals distinction when considering the ontological status of visual properties. One way of arguing in favour of the trope interpretation of visual properties is to claim that the way in which we visually experience properties makes it plausible to characterize them as tropes. In this article, I argue for a different position, namely that the way in which we visually experience properties provides a serious challenge for the trope interpretation, but not for an interpretation in terms of universals. More specifically, I claim that the trope interpretations of visual properties have problems accounting for the fact that ordinary, veridical visual experiences can present the properties of two objects as strictly similar.

中文翻译：

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Tropes，Universal和视觉现象学

当考虑视觉属性的本体论状态时，感知哲学家和分析形而上学的哲学家都应用了对位/通用的区别。赞成用望远镜对视觉属性进行解释的一种方法是，声称我们在视觉上体验属性的方式使得将它们表征为对数是合理的。在本文中，我主张一个不同的立场，即我们视觉上体验属性的方式为对音高的解释提出了严峻的挑战，而不是对通用性的解释提出了严峻的挑战。更具体地说，我认为视觉特性的平底镜解释存在一些问题，这说明了一个事实，即普通的，垂直的视觉体验可以将两个物体的特性呈现为严格相似。