One requirement of a theory of meaning for a natural language such as English is that it generate constraints on what speakers can use expressions to strictly and literally say or assert. Yet one significant recent philosophical defence of formal semantics, based on the technical innovations in semantics due to Kaplan, does not satisfy this requirement. On such a theory, meaning is a function from contexts to contents. But contexts in a Kaplanian theory are not uses of indexicals. Thus without some further bridge principle linking uses of indexicals to the contexts of a Kaplanian theory, functions from contexts to content do not determine any constraints on what an indexical can be used to strictly and literally say or assert. A great deal of recent work on Kaplanian theories has been dedicated to identifying the correct bridge principle in response to this challenge, but such work is doomed to fail. I argue that appeal to any such bridge principle in defence of a Kaplanian theory leads to an unacceptably weak account of the role of formal semantics in the study of human linguistic communication.

中文翻译：

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使用环境和限制

对自然语言（例如英语）的意义理论的一个要求是，它限制了说话者可以使用表达来严格和字面地说或断言的条件。然而，基于Kaplan在语义学上的技术创新的基础上，形式语义学的一种重要的近期哲学辩护并不能满足这一要求。根据这种理论，意义是从上下文到内容的功能。但是在卡普兰理论中，上下文并不是索引的使用。因此，如果没有某种进一步的桥接原则将索引词的使用与Kaplanian理论的上下文联系起来，从上下文到内容的功能就不会确定对索引词可用于严格和字面意义上的说法或主张的任何约束。最近有关卡普兰理论的大量工作致力于确定正确的桥梁原理，以应对这一挑战，但注定要失败。我认为，对捍卫卡普兰理论的任何这种桥梁原则的呼吁导致对形式语义学在人类语言交流研究中的作用的令人难以接受的薄弱解释。