In this article I propose a view which explains how it is possible that the disagreement concerning clear cases of a given vague predicate is genuine, whereas that concerning borderline cases is faultless. I take the possibility of faultless disagreement concerning borderline cases to be an important characteristic of vague predicates and in my view any adequate theory of vagueness should account for it. My proposal might be called “contextual supervaluationism” and it is inspired by Kölbel's relativist view from his paper “Vagueness as Semantic”. Following Kölbel I claim that the range of admissible sharpenings assumed by supervaluationism is context‐dependent, but contrary to him I maintain that we need supertruth as well as truth at a sharpening. Moreover – again unlike Kölbel – I argue that utterances concerning borderline cases are permissible. I claim, however, that such utterances should be assertives rather than assertions, since they express only a weak belief of the speaker. It is the different illocutionary forces of utterances concerning clear cases and borderline cases that make it possible to explain the distinct nature of disagreements over such cases.

中文翻译：

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关于模糊谓词的完美无误的意见分歧

在本文中，我提出一种观点，该观点解释了关于给定模糊谓词的清晰案例的意见分歧是真实的，而对于边界案例的意见分歧则是无误的。我认为关于边界案件的完全无误的分歧可能是模糊谓词的重要特征，我认为任何适当的模糊性理论都应对此加以解释。我的提议可能被称为“语境超值主义”，它的灵感来自于科尔贝尔（Kölbel）的相对主义观点，即他的论文《作为语义的模糊性》（Vagueness as Semantic）。继科尔贝尔之后，我声称超价值主义假设的允许锐化的范围是取决于上下文的，但是与他相反，我坚持认为在锐化中我们既需要超现实，也需要真理。此外，与科尔贝尔不同，我认为关于边缘案件的言论是允许的。但是，我声称，这样的话语应该是断言而不是断言，因为它们仅表达了说话者的一种较弱的信念。正是由于涉及明确案例和边界案例的话语表达能力的不同，才有可能解释此类案例分歧的独特性质。