I discuss a criterion for successful communication between a speaker and a hearer put forward by Buchanan according to which there is communicative success only if the hearer entertains, as a result of interpreting the speaker’s utterance, a thought that has the same truth conditions as the thought asserted by the speaker and, furthermore, does so in virtue of recognizing the speaker’s communicative intentions. I argue, against Buchanan, that the data on which it is based are compatible with a view involving Fregean modes of presentation. In the second part of the article I critically discuss Unnsteinsson’s claim that communicative success depends on the absence of contextually salient false distinctness beliefs about the subject matter of the conversation. I argue that this thesis leads to clearly counterintuitive consequences and that no fundamental role must be given to the presence or absence of false distinctness beliefs in one’s account of successful communication. The upshot is that we should stick with Buchanan’s criterion. I conclude by employing Strawson and Recanati’s concepts of linking and merging to show how the criterion I favour is compatible with the fact that, when subjects hold no relevant false distinctness beliefs, communicative success does not seem to be disrupted by the hearer seemingly failing to recognize the speaker’s intentions.

中文翻译：

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成功的沟通，意图和错误信念

我讨论了Buchanan提出的在说话者和听者之间进行成功交流的标准，根据该准则，只有在听者通过解释说话者的言语而接受了与该思想具有相同真实条件的思想时，交流才会成功并由说话者断言，而且是通过承认说话者的交流意图来做到这一点的。我反对布坎南，认为它所基于的数据与涉及Fregean表示方式的视图兼容。在文章的第二部分中，我将严格讨论Unnsteinsson的论点，即交流成功取决于对对话主题缺乏上下文突出的虚假鲜明性信念。我认为，这一论点显然会导致违反直觉的后果，并且在成功交往的过程中，对于存在或不存在错误的独特性信念，没有任何根本性的作用。结果是我们应该遵守布坎南的准则。最后，我通过运用Strawson和Recanati的链接和合并概念来说明我所支持的标准与以下事实相兼容：当受试者没有相关的虚假鲜明性信念时，交流成功似乎不会因听者似乎无法识别而受到干扰。演讲者的意图。