First, we argue that the appeal of effective altruism (henceforth, EA) depends significantly on a certain empirical premise we call the Heavy Tail Hypothesis (HTH), which characterizes the probability distribution of opportunities for doing good. Roughly, the HTH implies that the best causes, interventions, or charities produce orders of magnitude greater good than the average ones, constituting a substantial portion of the total amount of good caused by altruistic interventions. Next, we canvass arguments EAs have given for the existence of a positive (or “right”) heavy tail and argue that they can also apply in support of a negative (or “left”) heavy tail where counterproductive interventions do orders of magnitude more harm than ineffective or moderately harmful ones. Incorporating the other heavy tail of the distribution has important implications for the core activities of EA: effectiveness research, cause prioritization, and the assessment of altruistic interventions. It also informs the debate surrounding the institutional critique of EA.

中文翻译：

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适得其反的利他主义：另一个沉重的尾巴

首先，我们认为有效利他主义（此后称为EA）的吸引力在很大程度上取决于一定的经验前提，我们称之为“重尾巴假设”（HTH），该假设表征了行善机会的概率分布。粗略地讲，HTH意味着最好的原因，干预或慈善产生的善良数量要比平均水平大，数量级高，占利他干预所造成的善良总量的很大一部分。接下来，我们讨论EA提出的存在正（或“右”）沉重尾巴的论点，并争辩说它们也可以用于支持负（或“左”）沉重尾巴，其中适得其反的干预措施会产生更多数量级比无效或中度危害的危害更大。纳入分布的其他沉重尾巴对于EA的核心活动具有重要意义：有效性研究，原因优先级排序和利他干预措施的评估。它还为围绕EA机构批评的辩论提供了信息。