It is often assumed that perceptual experience provides evidence about the external world. But much perception can occur unconsciously, as in cases of masked priming or blindsight. Does unconscious perception provide evidence as well? Many theorists maintain that it cannot, holding that perceptual experience provides evidence in virtue of its conscious character. Against such views, I challenge here both the necessity and, perhaps more controversially, the sufficiency of consciousness for perception to provide evidence about the external world. In addition to motivating and defending the idea that unconscious perception can and does often provide evidence, I observe that whether or not perceptual phenomenology is relevant to the evidentiary status of perception depends on the nature of consciousness. And I argue that a well‐supported theory of consciousness—higher‐order thought theory—invites a striking conclusion: that perceptual phenomenology is not on its own sufficient to provide for evidence of the external world.

中文翻译：

---

知觉意识没有认知作用

通常认为，知觉经验提供了有关外部世界的证据。但是，在蒙蔽的启动或视力不佳的情况下，很多知觉可能会在不知不觉中发生。无意识的感知是否也提供证据？许多理论家坚持认为它不能，认为知觉经验凭借其意识特性提供了证据。反对这样的观点，我在这里挑战必要性，也许是更具争议性的，是为了提供关于外部世界的证据而需要知觉的意识的充分性。除了激发和捍卫无意识知觉可以而且确实提供证据的观点外，我观察到知觉现象学是否与知觉的证据状态有关还取决于意识的性质。