In perception, perceivers discriminate. They distinguish or single out the objects and property instances that they see. One might hope this discriminatory nature of perception could help explain how perceptual evidence can be sufficient for knowledge, even granting some form of a relevant alternatives condition on knowledge. Indeed, there are examples of such thinking in recent epistemology literature. But I argue that discriminating actual percepts from actual surrounds is importantly different than discriminating actual states of affairs from merely possible states of affairs. A tension remains between optimism about immediate perceptual knowledge and plausible relevant alternatives or safety conditions on knowledge in general.

中文翻译：

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知觉，歧视和知识

在感知中，感知者有区别。他们区分或挑选出看到的对象和属性实例。人们可能希望这种歧视性的性质可以帮助解释知觉证据如何足以满足知识的需求，甚至可以为知识提供某种形式的相关替代条件。确实，在最近的认识论文献中有这种思维的例子。但我认为，将实际感知与实际环境区分开来与将实际事物状态与仅可能的事物状态区分开来有很大不同。在对即时感知知识的乐观与对知识的合理的相关替代方案或安全条件之间仍然存在紧张关系。