1 INTRODUCTION

Suppose that I'm charged with helping a child learn his colours. The child has a number of uniformly coloured cubes, and we play the ‘which colour?’ game. This involves him presenting me with a cube and me saying which colour it is, and then me presenting him with a cube and him saying which colour it is, and so on. He holds up a green cube, and says ‘which colour?’ I say: ‘it's green’. I judge correctly. But is my judgement rational?

It depends on the scenario. Compare two. In the first, Inattentive, the game has been going on for what seems like hours, and I am losing the will to live. I go through the motions and just guess that the cube is green, without even looking. Though my judgement is correct, it is not rational. In the second scenario, Perception, I am playing the game properly and attentively. Based on what I can see, I judge that the cube is green. In Perception, my judgement is rational in the light of my visual perception.

This illustrates the phenomenon I want to focus on: the rationalizing role of visual perception. My interest is in whether reflecting upon this enables us to settle a dispute in the metaphysics of perceptual experience: that between representationalism and naive realism.¹

In §2 I clarify what it means to say that perceptions are rationalizing. In §3 I set out Ginsborg's (2011) argument which aims to show that reflecting upon the rationalizing role of perception supports representationalism.² In §4 I show how this argument can be extended so as to challenge naive realism. In §5 I explain why these arguments fail. I do not claim that reflecting upon the rationalizing role of visual perception supports naive realism over representationalism. Rather, I doubt that we can settle the dispute by reflecting on the rationalizing role of perception.

中文翻译：

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天真现实主义，表象主义和视觉感知的合理化作用

1引言

假设我负责帮助孩子学习他的颜色。这个孩子有许多颜色统一的立方体，我们玩“哪种颜色？” 游戏。这涉及他向我展示一个立方体，然后说出它是哪种颜色，然后我向他展示一个立方体，并说出它是哪种颜色，依此类推。他举起一个绿色立方体，然后说“哪种颜色？” 我说：“它是绿色的”。我判断正确。但是我的判断合理吗？

这取决于场景。比较两个。首先，《Inattentive》一直持续了好几个小时，而我却失去了生存的意愿。我经过这些动作，只猜立方体是绿色的，甚至没有看。尽管我的判断是正确的，但这不是理性的。在第二种情况下，Perception，我正在正确而专注地玩游戏。根据我所看到的，我判断该多维数据集是绿色的。在“感知”中，根据我的视觉感知，我的判断是理性的。

这说明了我要关注的现象：视觉感知的合理化作用。我的兴趣是反思这一点是否使我们能够解决感知经验的形而上学的一个争执：代表主义与天真现实主义之间的争执。^1个

在第2节中，我澄清了说观念正在合理化的含义。在第3节中，我提出了Ginsborg（2011）的论证，该论证旨在表明反思感知的合理化作用可以支持代表主义。²在§4中，我展示了如何扩展该论点以挑战天真现实主义。在§5中，我解释了为什么这些论点会失败。我并不主张反思视觉感知的合理化作用会支持幼稚的现实主义而不是表现主义。相反，我怀疑我们是否可以通过反思感知的合理化作用来解决争端。