One popular doctrine in 20th-century philosophy was conceptualism about perception. The core ideawas that perceptual awareness is structured by concepts possessed by the perceiver. A primary motivation for conceptualismwas epistemological: perception provides justification for belief, and this justificatory relation is only intelligible if perception, like belief, is conceptually structured (Brewer, 1999;McDowell, 1994; Sellars, 1956).We perceive that a is F, and thereby grasp perceptual evidence that justifies the belief that a is F and inferentially integrates with premises like If a is F then a is G to produce the belief that a is G. Conceptualism is less popular today (cf. Bengson, Grube, & Korman, 2011; Mandelbaum, 2018; Mandik, 2012). The a priori justification for conceptualism has crashed face-first into a wall of empirical evidence. For instance, children and non-human animals possess perceptual capacities despite lacking many hallmarks of conceptual cognition (Bermudez, 1998; Burge, 2010a; Block ms). Meanwhile, in adults, mental imagery and related phenomena implicate iconic rather than conceptual/propositional formats (Carey, 2009; Fodor, 2007; Quilty-Dunn, 2019a). A growing contingent of theorists thus regard perception as a natural kind marked by its proprietary nonconceptual representations (Burge, 2014; Burnston, 2017a; Carey, 2009; Kulvicki, 2015a; Toribio, 2011; Block, ms; see also Evans (1982); Hopp (2011); Peacocke (2001) for other nonconceptualist arguments). Though opinion has shifted strongly in favor of nonconceptualism, it may be time for the pendulum to swing back. Putting the traditional normative motivations for conceptualism aside, it makes sense even from a purely descriptive, naturalistic perspective that at least some of the vehicles of perception should be conceptual. Many cognitive operations make use of concepts; thus many cognitive responses to perception would be facilitated if some outputs of perception came prepackaged in a conceptualized format.

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从知觉到认知的概念和预测

20 世纪哲学中的一种流行学说是关于感知的概念主义。其核心思想是知觉意识是由知觉者所拥有的概念构成的。概念主义的一个主要动机是认识论：知觉为信念提供了辩护，这种辩护关系只有在知觉和信念一样在概念上是结构化的（Brewer，1999；McDowell，1994；Sellars，1956）时才可理解。我们认为 a 是 F，从而掌握证明 a 是 F 的信念的感性证据，并与前提（如如果 a 是 F，则 a 是 G）进行推理整合以产生 a 是 G 的信念。概念主义在今天不太流行（参见 Bengson、Grube 和 Korman , 2011; Mandelbaum, 2018; Mandik, 2012)。概念主义的先验理由已经直接撞到了经验证据的墙上。例如，尽管缺乏概念认知的许多特征，儿童和非人类动物仍具有感知能力（Bermudez，1998；Burge，2010a；Block ms）。同时，在成人中，心理意象和相关现象涉及标志性而非概念/命题格式（Carey，2009；Fodor，2007；Quilty-D​​unn，2019a）。因此，越来越多的理论家将感知视为一种以其专有的非概念表征为标志的自然类型（Burge，2014；Burnston，2017a；Carey，2009；Kulvicki，2015a；Toribio，2011；Block，ms；另见 Evans（1982）； Hopp (2011); Peacocke (2001) 的其他非概念主义论点）。尽管意见已经强烈转向非概念主义，但钟摆可能是时候回摆了。抛开概念主义的传统规范动机，即使从纯粹的描述性、自然主义的角度来看，至少某些感知工具应该是概念性的也是有道理的。许多认知操作使用概念；因此，如果感知的某些输出以概念化的格式预先包装，则可以促进对感知的许多认知反应。