Some epistemologists and philosophers of mind hold that the non‐epistemic perceptual relation of which feature‐seeing and object‐seeing are special cases is the foundation of perceptual knowledge. This paper argues that such relations are best understood as having only a technological role in explaining perceptual knowledge. After introducing the opposing view in §1, §2 considers why its defenders deny that some cases in which one has perceptual knowledge without the relevant acquaintance relations are counterexamples, detailing their case for lurking inferential epistemology. §§3–4 suggest that this strategy fails in many other cases. While there is a computational tale that might be deemed ‘inferential’ in these cases, there is no corresponding tale in epistemic structure, not even if one rejects what Siegel (2017) calls the ‘Reckoning Model’ of inference. §5 offers a more fundamental dilemma. §6 concludes that there is only a technological role for non‐epistemic perception in grounding perceptual knowledge, but allows that it might play a more‐than‐technological role elsewhere.

中文翻译：

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非流行知觉为技术

一些认识论者和心智哲学家认为，以特征观察和客体观察为特例的非认知知觉关系是知觉知识的基础。本文认为，这种关系最好理解为在解释感知知识方面仅具有技术作用。在第1节中提出了相反的观点之后，第2节考虑了为什么其辩护者否认某些具有知觉知识而没有相关熟人关系的案例是反例，详细说明了他们潜伏于推理认识论的案例。§§3–4表明，此策略在许多其他情况下也无效。尽管在这些情况下有一个计算故事可以被认为是“推论”，但在认知结构上没有相应的故事，即使有人拒绝西格尔（Siegel，2017）所谓的推论模型（Reckoning Model），也是如此。§5提供了更基本的难题。§6得出结论，非认知认知在知觉知识的基础上仅起技术作用，但允许它在其他地方起着比技术更重要的作用。