1 Setting the Scene

First, we can all agree that not all intentional actions are the product of reasoning. I can act for a reason without going through a process that is worth thinking of as reasoning. A process that is worth thinking of as reasoning must have a certain internal complexity. If I have a beer because I am hot and thirsty, that sort of complexity is lacking.

Here is an example of practical reasoning. I am grading a paper and decide for various reasons that it merits a B+. So I (decide to) give it a B+.

Now admittedly, in this case as described, there is some theoretical reasoning involved along the way. In standard philosophical shorthand, I decided to V because I had decided that p. But I might not have passed through the stage of deciding that the paper merits a B+ at all. I might simply have done what the reasons present in the case supported, or most supported, without passing through a stage at which I form what one might call the “thin” judgement that overall it merits a B+; just as I can do a right action for the reasons that make it right without passing through the thin recognition of rightness. And I might not have given it the grade which I had decided that it merited. Perhaps I know of some mitigating factors that persuade me not to award the grade that the paper strictly merits. But the actual case is straightforward, and the fact that I do not know of any such mitigating factors is not among my reasons for giving the grade that I do (though it may be among the reasons why I give the grade that I do).

In his discussion of the account of practical reasoning presented in my Practical Shape (2018) Schwenkler (2021) starts from the question how an action can be “drawn from” premises. You certainly cannot get the action out of the premises. But then you cannot get a belief out of premises either. His “better reason” (p. 2) for doubting the possibility of reasoning to action is that it is unclear how an action could ever follow from considerations adduced in the sort of way that a belief can follow from considerations adduced. But there is a danger of a false contrast here. Beliefs (in the sense of believings) cannot follow from considerations any more than actions can; it is things believed that do that. Accepting that p, however, is something we can decide to do, and something that we can do. And we can accept that p for the reasons that favour accepting that p, just as we can respond practically to a situation in the light of the reasons that favour our so responding. This, at least, is the position I take myself to be defending. I do not simply assume that practical and theoretical reasoning share a common form and are distinguished only by their content of subject matter, as Schwenkler at one point suggests (p. 3). I give a whole series of elaborate arguments designed to show that this can be so, and try to show that there is no reason to doubt that it is in fact so.

中文翻译：

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对施文克勒的回应

1 设置场景

首先，我们都同意并非所有有意的行为都是推理的产物。我可以为一个理由而行动，而无需经过一个值得被视为推理的过程。一个值得思考为推理的过程必须具有一定的内部复杂性。如果我因为又热又渴而喝啤酒，那么这种复杂性就缺乏了。

这是一个实际推理的例子。我正在给一篇论文评分，并出于各种原因决定它值得 B+。所以我（决定）给它一个 B+。

现在不可否认，在所描述的这种情况下，在此过程中涉及到一些理论推理。在标准的哲学速记中，我决定使用 V，因为我已经决定了 p。但我可能根本没有通过决定这篇论文值得 B+ 的阶段。我可能只是做了案件中提出的理由支持或最支持的事情，而没有经过一个阶段，在这个阶段我形成了人们可能称之为“薄弱”的判断，即总体上值得 B+；就像我可以出于使之正确的原因而做出正确的行动，而无需通过对正确的薄薄的认识。而且我可能不会给它我认为值得的等级。也许我知道一些减轻影响的因素说服我不要授予论文严格意义上的分数。但实际情况很简单，

在他对我的实用形状（2018）中提出的实践推理的讨论中，施文克勒（2021）) 从如何从前提“引出”一个动作的问题开始。你当然不能把动作带出场地。但是你也不能从前提中得到信念。他怀疑推理到行动的可能性的“更好的理由”（第 2 页）是，不清楚一个行动如何从引出的考虑推导出来，就像一个信念可以从引出的考虑推导出来一样。但这里存在虚假对比的危险。信念（在信念的意义上）不能像行动一样从考虑中产生；正是人们相信的东西才能做到这一点。然而，接受 p 是我们可以决定做的事情，也是我们可以做的事情。我们可以接受那个 p，因为有利于接受那个 p，正如我们可以根据有利于我们做出如此反应的原因来实际应对情况一样。至少，这是我认为自己要捍卫的立场。我不简单假设实践推理和理论推理具有共同的形式，并且仅通过它们的主题内容来区分，正如 Schwenkler 曾建议的那样（第 3 页）。我给出了一系列精心设计的论证，旨在表明这可能是事实，并试图表明没有理由怀疑事实确实如此。