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Grounding, metaphysical laws, and structure
Analytic Philosophy Pub Date : 2021-01-08 , DOI: 10.1111/phib.12216
Martin Grajner 1
Affiliation  

According to the deductive-nomological account of ground, a fact A grounds another fact B in case the laws of metaphysics determine the existence of B on the basis of the existence of A. Accounts of grounding of this particular variety have already been developed in the literature. My aim in this paper is to sketch a new version of this account. My preferred account offers two main improvements over existing accounts. First, the present account is able to deal with necessitarian as well as non-necessitarian cases of grounding by acknowledging the existence of two types of metaphysical laws. I will argue that we should assume that metaphysical laws come in the necessitarian as well as in the non-necessitarian variety—closely paralleling the distinction between strict and non-strict laws in the philosophy of science. The second main improvement of the present account is that this account is able to provide an explanation of why the laws of metaphysics have a direction built into them. I will argue that we should characterize metaphysical laws with the help of Theodore Sider’s (2011) notion of structure, which is a descendent of David Lewis’s (1983) notion of naturalness. According to the account of metaphysical laws developed in this paper, metaphysical laws express in their antecedents either perfectly structural truths or more structural truths than in their consequents. Since on Sider’s account structural features of reality are fundamental features of reality, the account is able to explain as to why the laws of metaphysics take us from the fundamental to the derivative.

中文翻译:

基础、形而上学规律和结构

根据根据的演绎法学解释,如果形而上学的规律根据 A 的存在来确定 B 的存在,那么事实 A 会根据另一个事实 B。文学。我在本文中的目的是勾勒出这个帐户的新版本。我的首选帐户与现有帐户相比有两个主要改进。首先,通过承认存在两种形而上学规律,本文能够处理必要性和非必要性的基础案例。我将争辩说,我们应该假设形而上学的规律出现在必然论和非必然论变体中——这与科学哲学中严格和非严格规律之间的区别非常相似。本说明的第二个主要改进是,该说明能够解释为什么形而上学的规律有一个内置的方向。我将争辩说,我们应该借助 Theodore Sider (2011) 的结构概念来描述形而上学的规律,该概念是 David Lewis (1983) 自然性概念的后裔。根据本文发展的形而上学规律的说明,形而上学规律在其前件中表达的要么是完美的结构真理,要么是比其结果更多的结构真理。由于根据西德尔的说法,现实的结构特征是现实的基本特征,因此该帐户能够解释为什么形而上学的规律将我们从基础带到派生。
更新日期:2021-01-08
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