Barnes (2014, Analytic Philosophy, 55, 339) has argued on this journal for the following conditional: If there is any metaphysical indeterminacy, this must be at the most fundamental level of reality. To argue for this claim, Barnes relies on two principles that I shall call bivalent completeness and determinate link. According to the former, a complete description is a bivalent assignment of truth values to every sentence. The determinate link, instead, establishes that the determination relation between levels of reality preserves determinacy from one level to another. In response to Barnes’ conclusion, Eva (2018, Thought, 7, 31) has recently pointed out that bivalent completeness is question begging. In this paper, I will first show why Eva's line of reasoning can be resisted. My aim will then be to present a stronger case against Barnes’ argument by challenging the determinate link. In the presence of metaphysical indeterminacy, the link between fundamental and derivative facts might itself be the locus of indeterminacy. I will conclude by showing that Barnes and Eva make many unwarranted assumptions regarding both indeterminacy and fundamentality. The logical space around the connection between these two notions appears to be much wider than what they seem to be aware of, or so I will argue.

中文翻译：

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不确定性：深而不是谷底

Barnes (2014, Analytic Philosophy , 55, 339) 在该期刊上提出了以下条件：如果存在任何形而上学的不确定性，这一定是在最基本的现实水平上。为了论证这一主张，Barnes 依赖于我称之为二价完整性和确定链接的两个原则。根据前者，完整的描述是对每个句子的真值的二价分配。相反，确定的联系确立了现实层次之间的确定关系保持了从一个层次到另一个层次的确定性。针对 Barnes 的结论，Eva (2018, Thought , 7, 31) 最近指出二价完整性是乞讨。在本文中，我将首先说明为什么 Eva 的推理路线可以被抵制。然后，我的目标是通过挑战确定的联系来提出一个更有力的理由来反对巴恩斯的论点。在存在形而上学不确定性的情况下，基本事实和派生事实之间的联系本身可能就是不确定性的所在。最后，我将展示 Barnes 和 Eva 对不确定性和基本性做出了许多毫无根据的假设。围绕这两个概念之间的联系的逻辑空间似乎比他们似乎意识到的要广泛得多，或者我会这样争论。