In his Consciousness and Fundamental Reality (2017), Philip Goff defends his anti-physicalist argument against what he calls the "Dual Carving" objection—the idea that two representations of the very same fact could both be conceptually independent and "transparent," that is, revealing of the essences of the entities in question. His defense invokes a thesis he calls "Minimal Rationalism." I explore exactly how Minimal Rationalism is supposed to turn aside the objection and argue that the formulation of Minimal Rationalism on offer is ambiguous between stronger and weaker readings. Goff needs the stronger reading to use it in defense of his argument, but only the weaker reading is warranted by the considerations he brings to bear in favor of his rationalism. His "Minimal Rationalism" is, in sum, insufficiently minimal. The upshot is not only that Goff is deprived of a way of turning back an important objection to his case against physicalism; we also gain a better sense of what kind of rationalist thesis is properly invoked in metaphysics.

中文翻译：

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双重雕刻和极简理性主义

在他的意识和基本现实中(2017)，菲利普·戈夫 (Philip Goff) 为他的反物理主义论点辩护，反对他所谓的“双重雕刻”反对意见——即同一事实的两种表述在概念上既可以是独立的又是“透明的”，即本质的揭示有问题的实体。他的辩护援引了一篇他称之为“极简理性主义”的论文。我确切地探讨了极简理性主义应该如何推翻反对意见，并认为所提供的极简理性主义的表述在强读和弱读之间是模棱两可的。戈夫需要更强的解读来使用它来捍卫他的论点，但只有较弱的解读才能得到他为支持他的理性主义所做的考虑。总而言之，他的“极简理性主义”还不够极简。结果不仅是戈夫被剥夺了反驳对他反对物理主义的重要反对意见的方法；我们也对形而上学中恰当地引用了什么样的理性主义命题有了更好的认识。