There are many modal epistemologies available to us. Which should we endorse? According to Bob Hale, we can start to answer this question by examining the architecture of modal knowledge. That is, we can try to decide between the following claims: (1) knowing that p is possible is essentially a matter of having a well-founded belief that there are no conflicting necessities—a necessity-based approach—and (2) knowing that p is necessary is essentially a matter of having a well-founded belief that there are no conflicting possibilities—a possibility-based approach. Hale argues for the first of these claims, but I contend that his arguments fail. However, it doesn't follow that we should endorse a possibility-based approach. I repurpose Hale's arguments to show those who would endorse possibility-based approaches need to say more about our modal knowledge concerning logic and mathematics; if they can't, then they ought to endorse a hybrid modal epistemology that doesn't give priority to one modality across the board. Additionally, those who endorse possibility-based views may be committed to Peter van Inwagen's modal skepticism.

中文翻译：

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Hale 论模态知识的架构

有许多模态认识论可供我们使用。我们应该支持哪个？根据 Bob Hale 的说法，我们可以通过检查模态知识的架构来开始回答这个问题。也就是说，我们可以尝试在以下主张之间做出决定：（1）知道 p 是可能的本质上是一个有充分根据的信念，即不存在相互冲突的必要性——一种基于必要性的方法——以及（2）知道p 是必要的本质上是一个有充分根据的信念，即不存在相互冲突的可能性——一种基于可能性的方法。黑尔支持这些主张中的第一个，但我认为他的论点失败了。然而，这并不意味着我们应该认可基于可能性的方法。我重新利用了黑尔 那些支持基于可能性的方法的论点需要更多地说明我们关于逻辑和数学的模态知识；如果他们不能，那么他们应该认可一种混合模态认识论，它不优先考虑一种模态。此外，那些支持基于可能性的观点的人可能会接受 Peter van Inwagen 的模态怀疑论。