This article seeks to explain revolutionary Iran's convoluted rise to regional prominence over the last three decades. We hold that perceptions and misperceptions of regime stability (both of one's self and of others) by the relevant actors have played a major role in Iran's recent. The main logic is that the success of many strategies employed by relevant regional actors to augment their regional influence (both Iran seeking more influence and others seeking to stem that influence) have crucially hinged on making correct assessments of regime stability. This study has both theoretical and empirical findings. Theoretically, we find that failures to accurately estimate regime stability stem from three main sources: (1) objective uncertainties regarding the target state's level of regime stability, given the high strength of societal forces shaping state‐society relations in the Middle East and given the distinct variation between autocrats in terms of their ability to develop effective counterrevolutionary/repressive tools; (2) ideological blinders, from which both the United States and regional actors frequently suffer, which have often led them to be falsely optimistic regarding the existence of either subversive opportunities or opportunities to stabilize regimes facing domestic pressures; and (3) incorrect theories regarding sources of regime stability which lead experts and policymakers to overlook factors which may destabilize a regime. This article has two major empirical findings. First, Iran's rise may be at least partly attributed to Iran demonstrating a slightly better learning curve at the tactical level (i.e., learning subversive skills from its Lebanese experience in the 1980s–1990s and applying them to Iraq in the 2000s–2010s) as well as at the strategic level (i.e., understanding the limits of its subversive capacities and correctly assessing when it can engage in successful stabilizing operations). Second, two errors committed by the United States have been far more consequential than those committed by Iran for the regional balance of power: First, the George W. Bush Administration myopically opened up subversive opportunities for Iran when it invaded Iraq in 2003 by thinking that it could stabilize a democratic regime and insulate it from outside influence; second, on two occasions Washington overestimated the transformative effect that its concessions to Iran would have in terms of sufficiently empowering reformists so as to bring about complete regime transformation from within.

中文翻译：

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对政权稳定和伊朗对地区影响的不安崛起的感知和误解

本文旨在解释在过去的三十年中革命性的伊朗令人费解的崛起，以其在地区上的突出地位。我们认为，有关行为者对政权稳定（一个人的自我和他人的稳定）的看法和误解在最近的伊朗中发挥了重要作用。主要逻辑是，有关区域参与者采取的许多提高其区域影响力的策略（伊朗寻求更大的影响力，而其他试图阻止这种影响力的策略）的成功，关键在于正确评估政权的稳定性。这项研究具有理论和经验方面的发现。从理论上讲，我们发现未能准确估计政权稳定性的原因主要来自三个方面：（1）客观不确定性考虑到目标国家政权的稳定水平，考虑到形成中东国家社会关系的强大社会力量，以及独裁者在开发有效的反革命/镇压工具方面的能力存在明显差异；（2）意识形态盲目者，美国和地区行为者都经常遭受这种意识形态盲者的折磨，这常常使他们对存在颠覆性机会或稳定面临国内压力的政权的机会持错误的乐观态度；（3）关于政权稳定来源的错误理论这导致专家和政策制定者忽略了可能破坏政权稳定的因素。本文有两个主要的经验发现。首先，伊朗的崛起至少可以部分归因于伊朗略微表现出在战术层面（例如，从其1980年代至1990年代的黎巴嫩经验中学习颠覆性技能，并在2000年代至2010年代将其应用于伊拉克）中以及在战略层面（例如，了解其颠覆能力的局限性）获得更好的学习曲线并正确评估何时可以成功进行稳定操作）。其次，美国为地区力量平衡所犯的两个错误比伊朗所犯的错误要严重得多：首先，乔治·W·布什政府在2003年入侵伊拉克时为伊朗开辟了颠覆性的机会，他认为它可以稳定民主政权并使之不受外界影响；第二，