Consumers rely on intermediaries (“influencers”) such as social media recommendations to provide information about products. The advice may be mixed with endorsement in a way that is unobservable to the follower, creating a trade‐off for influencers between the best advice and the most revenue. This article models the dynamic relationship between an influencer and a follower. The relationship evolves between periods of less and more revenue. The model can provide insight into policies such as the Federal Trade Commission's mandatory disclosure rules. An opt‐in policy may be superior: it deregulates influencers who are reaping the rewards of past good advice.

中文翻译：

---

免费广告（副词）：互联网影响者和披露规定

消费者依靠诸如社交媒体推荐之类的中介（“影响者”）来提供有关产品的信息。忠告可能以追随者无法察觉的方式与认可相混合，从而在最佳忠告和最大收益之间为影响者创造了一个折衷方案。本文对影响者和关注者之间的动态关系进行建模。这种关系在收入越来越少的时期之间演变。该模型可以提供对政策的洞察力，例如联邦贸易委员会的强制性披露规则。选择接受政策可能会更好：它放宽了那些从过去的好建议中获得回报的网红。