Many regulators utilize self-reporting, that is, wrongdoers reporting their own crimes to the authority, to enforce regulations in a variety of market contexts. This paper studies the effectiveness of self-reporting within the context of an oligopoly. We identify two important consequences of implementing self-reporting (relative to no-reporting) for a welfare-maximizing regulator. First, if the regulator can control only the audit probability and fine, then whether compliance rises or falls upon implementing self-reporting depends on the level of competition. Second, if the regulator can also control the market size, then the welfare-maximizing policy entails self-reporting but with more competition and lower compliance than under no-reporting.

中文翻译：

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自我报告和市场结构

许多监管机构利用自我报告，即不法行为者向当局报告自己的罪行，在各种市场环境中执行监管。本文研究了寡头垄断背景下自我报告的有效性。我们确定了为福利最大化监管机构实施自我报告（相对于不报告）的两个重要后果。首先，如果监管者只能控制审计概率和罚款，那么实施自我报告的合规性是上升还是下降取决于竞争水平。其次，如果监管者也可以控制市场规模，那么福利最大化政策需要自我报告，但与不报告相比，竞争更多，合规性更低。