The provision of public goods plays a key role in the survival of leaders in democracies. Assuming that mass rail transport shares many of the characteristics of public goods, we claim that the public provision of railway services is more beneficial for political leaders in democracies than private provision. To estimate the effect of the type of provision of railway services on leader survival, we use new data on four European democracies that present variation in the public and private ownership of rail miles between 1913 and 1981. We find that the private provision of rail transport increases the hazard rates of leader deposition in these democracies. These results bear crucial implications, as they help to explain the sweeping policies of nationalization of public services that took place in the first half of the 20th Century in Western Europe.

公共物品的提供对民主国家领导人的生存起着关键作用。假设大众铁路运输具有公共物品的许多特征，我们声称公共提供的铁路服务对民主国家的政治领导人比私人提供更有利。为了估计铁路服务提供类型对领导者生存的影响，我们使用了四个欧洲民主国家的新数据，这些国家在 1913 年到 1981 年间铁路里程的公有和私人所有权存在差异。我们发现铁路运输的私人提供增加了这些民主国家领导人沉积的危险率。这些结果具有重要意义，因为它们有助于解释 20 世纪上半叶在西欧实施的全面公共服务国有化政策。