This article considers how the approach of the European Union (EU) and its Court of Justice to religion maps on to that of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). It will show that there is a high degree of convergence but that the broader remit of the Luxembourg Court means that its approach to religion will not be restricted to following that of the ECtHR. In particular, there is scope for significant differences between the two courts on the question of a ‘ministerial exemption’ in relation to the protection of the rights of employees of religious bodies and the question of indirect discrimination on grounds of religion or belief. These differences highlight the degree to which restricting indirect discrimination on religious grounds draws on ideas of collective disadvantage which are distinct from (and somewhat in tension with) the right to freedom of religion and belief as interpreted by the ECtHR which has seen religious freedom as primarily an individual right that applies equally to all forms of belief. The article closes by assessing what these potential differences tell us about the nature of the EU legal system, and the limits of role of rights in providing the basis for defining the relationship between religion, the state, and the law more generally.

中文翻译：

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从同一张赞美诗页唱歌？斯特拉斯堡和卢森堡法院之间的差异告诉我们宗教自由、非歧视和世俗国家

本文考虑了欧盟 (EU) 及其法院对宗教的态度如何映射到欧洲人权法院 (ECtHR)。这将表明存在高度趋同，但卢森堡法院更广泛的职权范围意味着其对宗教的态度将不会仅限于遵循欧洲人权法院的做法。特别是，在保护宗教团体雇员权利的“部长豁免”问题和基于宗教或信仰原因的间接歧视问题上，两个法院之间存在重大分歧。这些差异突出了限制基于宗教原因的间接歧视在多大程度上利用了集体不利的观念，这些观念与欧洲人权法院所解释的宗教和信仰自由权不同（并且有些紧张），后者将宗教自由视为主要一种平等适用于所有信仰形式的个人权利。文章最后评估了这些潜在差异告诉我们关于欧盟法律体系的性质，以及权利在为更广泛地定义宗教、国家和法律之间的关系提供基础方面的作用限制。