Among the different interpretations of the philosophy of Schelling, there is no doubt that the ones developed by Martin Heidegger and Karl Jaspers played a prominent role within the most recent Schelling scholarship. Both Heidegger and Jaspers focused on Schelling’s discourse on freedom, pointing out the fundamental incompatibility of its key elements, i.e. ‘ground’ and ‘existence’, as well as the fallacious conception of Seynsfuge that emerges from it. Moreover, Heidegger argues that Schelling’s ontology ultimately falls back into traditional metaphysical subjectivism, ignoring the question of Being as such and in fact paving the way to nihilism. Similarly, Jaspers criticizes Schelling’s arbitrary account of the relation between freedom and existential being and his misleading conception of transcendence. However, I argue against Jaspers that Schelling’s discourse on freedom must be read as a philosophy of immanence, which aims at maintaining the concreteness of the concepts and at avoiding any form of transcendence. Consequently, I also argue against Heidegger that not only does Schelling’s discourse successfully show the compatibility of ground and existence, but that Schelling’s understanding of the ‘subject’ does not comply with Heidegger’s notion of ‘metaphysical subjectivism’ and is immune to Heidegger’s criticism.

在对谢林哲学的不同解释中，毫无疑问，由马丁·海德格尔和卡尔·雅斯贝尔斯发展的那些在最近的谢林学术中发挥了突出的作用。海德格尔和雅斯贝尔斯都着眼于谢林关于自由的论述，指出其关键要素，即“基础”和“存在”的根本不相容，以及Seynsfuge的谬误概念从中浮现。此外，海德格尔认为，谢林的本体论最终落入了传统的形而上学主观主义，忽视了存在本身的问题，实际上为虚无主义铺平了道路。同样，雅斯贝尔斯批评谢林对自由与存在之间关系的武断描述以及他对超越的误导性概念。然而，我反对雅斯贝尔斯，认为谢林关于自由的论述必须被解读为一种内在性哲学，其目的是保持概念的具体性并避免任何形式的超越。因此，我也反对海德格尔，认为谢林的话语不仅成功地展示了根据与存在的兼容性，