This article examines Alfred Schutz’s concept of ‘multiple realities’, and in particular, his portrayal of science as one of these realities. It is noted that, while this concept has been widely cited, it has often been interpreted in ways that are at odds with key features of Schutz’s original formulation. A careful assessment is made of the main article he wrote dealing with this topic, focusing on the respects in which the ‘multiple realities’ he discusses are held to differ. Particular attention is given to the relationship between science and what Schutz calls ‘the paramount reality’, that of ‘daily life’. It is suggested that there are some serious problems with the distinctions he makes and that these relate to an ambiguity in his position: that he starts from within phenomenological psychology, drawing on the work of Husserl and James, but moves in a more naturalistic and sociological direction in his account of ‘the world of daily life’. This raises some fundamental questions about the nature of phenomenology and its relationship to social science.

中文翻译：

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舒茨关于科学是多重现实之一的概念

本文考察了阿尔弗雷德舒茨的“多重现实”概念，特别是他将科学描述为这些现实之一。需要注意的是，虽然这个概念被广泛引用，但它的解释方式往往与舒茨原始表述的关键特征不一致。对他撰写的关于该主题的主要文章进行了仔细评估，重点关注他所讨论的“多重现实”的不同方面。特别关注科学与舒茨所说的“至高无上的现实”，即“日常生活”之间的关系。有人认为，他所做的区分存在一些严重的问题，这些问题与他的立场含糊不清有关：他从现象学心理学内部开始，借鉴胡塞尔和詹姆斯的工作，但在他对“日常生活的世界”的描述中，却朝着更加自然主义和社会学的方向发展。这提出了一些关于现象学的本质及其与社会科学的关系的基本问题。