Barack Obama possesses the proverbial ‘‘Midas Touch’’ when it comes to race in American politics: everything he touches becomes racialized. We demonstrate this phenomenon using evaluations of the subjective performance of the economy. President Obama’s 2012 reelection campaign served as a subtle prime connecting the president to the economy, resulting in racial attitudes altering economic evaluations in 2012 to an extent never before seen. Racial attitudes influenced retrospective economic evaluations, but the effect of racial animosity was contingent on both partisanship and the presence or absence of positive information. While economic evaluations in 2012 were racialized, these effects depend on the political predispositions of the voter as well as the composition of the information environment surrounding the issue. Does race truly define the American political experience? In particular, does the election (and reelection) of the nation’s first African American president signal a new era of ‘‘post-racial’’ politics or one where race is even more politically important? While Barack Obama’s race undoubtedly influenced voters (Lewis-Beck, Tien, & Nadeau, 2010) in the past two presidential elections, we examine whether racial animosity altered voters’ reliance on electoral ‘‘fundamentals’’ and, if so, whether this influence is constrained in some way by partisan identities or media portrayals. Tesler and Sears (2010) claim that ‘‘any issue Obama takes a public stance on might soon become polarized according to racial predispositions’’ (p. 92). Tesler (2012) reinforces these claims by showing that health-care policy, among other issues, became racialized under President Obama but not under President Bill Clinton. At several points in their analysis, Tesler and Sears (2010) make explicit reference to voting fundamentals, including ‘‘such nonracial factors as gross domestic All correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Philip Chen, Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, Beloit College, 700 College Street Beloit, WI 53511 E-mail: chenp@beloit.edu Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/ijpor/advance-article-abstract/doi/10.1093/ijpor/edx014/4107243 by University of Wisconsin-Madison user on 03 May 2018 product growth, presidential approval ratings, consumer satisfaction, jobs creation, terms in office, and economic expectations’’ (p. 57, emphasis added). Without diminishing the findings of Tesler and Sears, we claim that even these voting fundamentals may not be as nonracial as the authors claim. Using observational data from the American National Election Study and experimental data, which manipulates the presence of information about economic performance, we demonstrate that retrospective economic evaluations, a key component of many economic voting models (Hopkins, 2012; Lewis-Beck & Paldam, 2000; Lewis-Beck & Stegmaier, 2000), became racialized during Obama’s presidency. Furthermore, we show that this racialization can be attenuated by the presence of positive economic information for some partisan groups. These results raise normative questions regarding the ability of voters to form important political or economic evaluations free of influence from politically irrelevant predispositions such as racial animosity. In presidential elections before 2012, voters showed little proclivity toward relying on racial attitudes when evaluating the U.S. economy. However, our findings show that President Obama became so intricately tied to economic performance that voters could not form economic opinions without thinking of race. The result is a hidden racialization, with a diminished direct effect of racial attitudes (compared with 2008) but a previously unrealized influence of race through economic evaluations. These findings are troubling, as they suggest that subjective economic opinions may be partially informed by immaterial racial attitudes. Relying on a similar theoretical framework as Tesler and Sears (Tesler, 2012; Tesler & Sears, 2010), we believe that Obama’s close association with and campaigning on the economy primed voters to associate Obama (an already racialized figure) with their economic evaluations, leading to racialization of economic evaluations. However, we find that presenting individuals with positive information about the economy can lead to a reduction in reliance on racial attitudes when evaluating economic performance in some cases. Racial Animosity and Spillover As the blatant, ‘‘old school’’ racism of the 19th century faded from American culture, scholars argued that a new type of racism took its place. This ‘‘new’’ racism was defined not by a belief in biological differences between the races but on the belief that Blacks do not deserve assistance from the government because they are lazy, demanding, or undeserving of help (Kinder & Sanders, 1996; Kinder & Sears, 1981). The measures of this new ‘‘symbolic’’ racism, deemed racial resentment, paired racial antipathy with beliefs about individualism, ostensibly forming the link between these two concepts. Gilens’s (1996) work on 1 Data for replication are available from the corresponding author. I N T E R N A T I O N A L J O U R N A L O F P U B L I C O P I N I O N R E S E A R C H 2 Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/ijpor/advance-article-abstract/doi/10.1093/ijpor/edx014/4107243 by University of Wisconsin-Madison user on 03 May 2018 welfare policies demonstrated the influence of these racial attitudes on policy preferences and other scholars followed suit, showing that individuals with negative attitudes toward Blacks are less supportive of spending on social welfare (Gilens, 1999; Goren, 2003, 2008; Kinder & Sanders, 1996). Recently, scholars began to examine whether racial attitudes influence beliefs beyond the traditional policy realms of social welfare spending. While some scholars offer qualifications to the extent that race can influence policy attitudes (Goren, 2008), the idea of racial spillover entered political science with the election of President Obama. The theory claims that when Obama is closely associated with a policy, the association leads racial attitudes to influence beliefs about the policy even when the policy itself has no racial component (Tesler, 2012). This leads to an enhanced use of racial attitudes when voters evaluate him (Kinder & Dale-Riddle, 2012; Tesler & Sears, 2010). Spillover, however, posits a second-order effect: when Obama is closely associated with a policy, this association leads racial attitudes to influence attitudes about that policy even if the policy itself has no racial component. During Obama’s first term, Tesler (2012) showed that this occurred during the health-care debate, while Tesler and Sears (2010) demonstrated this across a multitude of attitudes and behaviors. Although Tesler (2012, 2015) argues that Obama’s association with a policy, namely, health care, serves as enough of a cue to racialize the policy, the foundation of his argument rests in the racial priming literature (Mendelberg, 1997, 2001, 2008). While Tesler and Sears (2010) argue their case with evidence on voting behavior and attitudes about candidates and issue positions, we believe the effects extend further, ultimately altering one of the fundamental indicators used by scholars to predict presidential elections: economic evaluations. We argue that Obama’s close association with the national economy led to a similarly constant prime during his presidency. This relationship between racial attitudes and economic evaluations should exist to some extent for all individuals, regardless of political predispositions. We claim, however, that boundary conditions exist, which can attenuate the influence of racial attitudes. We experimentally test one possible condition (the presence of positive economic information) and demonstrate that the effects of racial predispositions can indeed be reduced, if not completely alleviated, at times. Racial Spillover Boundary Conditions Although racial spillover into economic evaluations should occur for all individuals, research suggests that this relationship should be conditional. We explore two possible contingencies in this article: an individual’s partisan identity and the presence of positive economic information. Beginning with party identification, we adopt a view of partisanship as a social identity as advocated by Green, Palmquist, and Schickler (2002). In essence, partisanship acts as a O B A M A ’ S E C O N O M Y I N T O T H E E C O N O M Y 3 Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/ijpor/advance-article-abstract/doi/10.1093/ijpor/edx014/4107243 by University of Wisconsin-Madison user on 03 May 2018 countervailing force for some individuals (namely, Democrats during Obama’s presidency) against the influence of racial animosity on economic evaluations. We argue that partisans are motivated to hold attitudes that confirm their identity, so Democrats should be motivated to hold positive views of the economy, while Republicans should be motivated to hold negative views (Kunda, 1990; Lodge & Taber, 2013; Taber & Lodge, 2006). For (nonBlack) Democrats, President Obama represents two competing social groups: a shared in-group based on partisanship and a non-shared out-group based on race. The desire to support an in-group partisan should reduce the influence of out-group animosity based on race. Republicans, on the other hand, lack the in-group partisan affinity. This results in greater reliance on racial animus when evaluating the economy, with Republicans relying more on race, Democrats less, and Independents falling somewhere in the middle. In addition to the potential moderating role of party identification, we test for the possibility that positive economic information reduces the influence of race on economic information. While partisan bias plays an important role in driving public opinion, conditions do exist when information cues can overrid

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奥巴马的经济：有条件的种族溢出影响经济评估

当谈到美国政治中的种族时，巴拉克·奥巴马 (Barack Obama) 拥有众所周知的“点石成金”：他所接触的一切都被种族化了。我们使用对经济主观表现的评估来证明这种现象。奥巴马总统 2012 年的连任竞选起到了将总统与经济联系起来的微妙作用，导致种族态度在 2012 年以前所未有的程度改变了经济评估。种族态度影响回顾性经济评估，但种族仇恨的影响取决于党派偏见和正面信息的存在与否。虽然 2012 年的经济评估是种族化的，但这些影响取决于选民的政治倾向以及围绕该问题的信息环境的构成。种族真的定义了美国的政治经验吗？特别是，国家的第一个非洲裔美国总统的选举（和蝉联）是一个新时代的“后场后”政治或比赛更为重要的人的一个新的时代？虽然巴拉克·奥巴马的种族无疑影响了过去两次总统选举中的选民（Lewis-Beck、Tien 和 Nadeau，2010 年），但我们研究了种族仇恨是否改变了选民对选举“基本面”的依赖，如果是，这种影响是否在某种程度上受到党派身份或媒体形象的限制。Tesler 和Sears (2010) 声称“奥巴马采取公开立场的任何问题都可能很快根据种族倾向变得两极分化”（第92 页）。Tesler (2012) 通过表明医疗保健政策等问题，强化了这些主张，在奥巴马总统时期被种族化，但在比尔克林顿总统时期没有。在他们的分析中，Tesler 和 Sears (2010) 在几个方面明确提到了投票基本面，包括“国内总收入等非种族因素”所有与本文有关的信件都应寄给 Beloit 政治学系助理教授 Philip Chen College, 700 College Street Beloit, WI 53511 电子邮件：chenp@beloit.edu 由大学下载自 https://academic.oup.com/ijpor/advance-article-abstract/doi/10.1093/ijpor/edx014/4107243 Wisconsin-Madison 用户在 2018 年 5 月 3 日的产品增长、总统支持率、消费者满意度、创造就业机会、任期和经济预期”（第 57 页，强调已添加）。在不削弱特斯勒和西尔斯的发现的情况下，我们声称，即使是这些投票基础也可能不像作者声称的那样非种族。使用来自美国全国选举研究的观察数据和操纵经济表现信息的实验数据，我们证明回顾性经济评估是许多经济投票模型的关键组成部分（Hopkins，2012；Lewis-Beck & Paldam，2000 ; Lewis-Beck & Stegmaier, 2000)，在奥巴马总统任期内变得种族化。此外，我们表明，某些党派团体的积极经济信息的存在可以减弱这种种族化。这些结果提出了关于选民在不受政治无关倾向（如种族仇恨）影响的情况下形成重要政治或经济评估的能力的规范性问题。在 2012 年之前的总统选举中，选民在评估美国经济时几乎没有表现出依赖种族态度的倾向。然而，我们的调查结果表明，奥巴马总统与经济表现的联系如此错综复杂，以至于选民无法在不考虑种族的情况下形成经济观点。结果是一种隐藏的种族化，种族态度的直接影响减弱了（与 2008 年相比），但之前未通过经济评估实现的种族影响。这些发现令人不安，因为它们表明主观经济观点可能部分受非物质种族态度的影响。依靠与 Tesler 和 Sears 类似的理论框架（Tesler，2012；Tesler & Sears，2010），我们认为，奥巴马与经济的密切联系和竞选活动促使选民将奥巴马（一个已经种族化的人物）与他们的经济评估联系起来，导致经济评估的种族化。然而，我们发现，在某些情况下，向个人提供有关经济的积极信息可以减少对种族态度的依赖。种族仇恨和外溢 随着 19 世纪公然的、“老派”种族主义从美国文化中消失，学者们认为一种新型的种族主义取而代之。这种“新”种族主义的定义不是相信种族之间的生物学差异，而是相信黑人不应该得到政府的帮助，因为他们懒惰、苛求或不值得帮助（Kinder & Sanders，1996；金德和西尔斯，1981 年）。这种被视为种族仇恨的新“象征性”种族主义的措施，将种族反感与个人主义信仰结合起来，表面上形成了这两个概念之间的联系。Gilens (1996) 关于 1 Data for replication 的工作可从相应的作者处获得。INTERNATIONALJOURNALO FPUBLICOPINIONRESEARC H 2 威斯康星大学麦迪逊分校用户于 2018 年 5 月 3 日从 https://academic.oup.com/ijpor/advance-article-abstract/doi/10.1093/ijpor/edx014/4107243 下载，证明了福利政策的影响这些种族对政策偏好的态度和其他学者纷纷效仿，表明对黑人持消极态度的个人对社会福利支出的支持度较低（Gilens，1999；Goren，2003，2008；Kinder & Sanders，1996）。最近，学者们开始研究种族态度是否会影响超出社会福利支出的传统政策领域的信念。虽然有些学者提供资格，即种族可以影响政策态度（Goren，2008），种族溢出的想法与奥巴马总统选举进入政治科学。该理论声称，当奥巴马与一项政策密切相关时，即使该政策本身没有种族成分，这种联系也会导致种族态度影响对该政策的信念（Tesler，2012）。这导致选民在评价他时更多地使用种族态度（金德和戴尔-里德尔，2012 年；特斯勒和西尔斯，2010 年）。然而，溢出假定了二阶效应：当奥巴马与一项政策密切相关时，这种关联导致种族态度影响对该政策的态度，即使该政策本身没有种族成分。在奥巴马的第一个任期内，Tesler (2012) 表明这发生在医疗保健辩论中，而 Tesler 和 Sears (2010) 则通过多种态度和行为证明了这一点。尽管 Tesler (2012, 2015) 认为奥巴马与一项政策的关联，即医疗保健，足以作为将该政策种族化的线索，但他的论点的基础在于种族启动文学 (Mendelberg, 1997, 2001, 2008 ）。虽然 Tesler 和 Sears (2010) 用关于投票行为和对候选人和议题立场的态度的证据来论证他们的案例，但我们认为影响进一步扩大，最终改变了学者用来预测总统选举的基本指标之一：经济评价。我们认为，奥巴马与国民经济的密切联系导致了他在总统任期内同样稳定的黄金时期。无论政治倾向如何，种族态度和经济评价之间的这种关系都应该在某种程度上存在于所有人身上。然而，我们声称存在边界条件，可以减弱种族态度的影响。我们通过实验测试了一种可能的条件（存在积极的经济信息），并证明种族倾向的影响有时确实可以减少，即使不能完全缓解。种族溢出边界条件 虽然种族溢出到经济评估应该发生在所有人身上，但研究表明，这种关系应该是有条件的。我们在本文中探讨了两种可能的偶然情况：个人的党派身份和积极的经济信息的存在。从政党认同开始，我们采用了 Green、Palmquist 和 Schickler (2002) 所倡导的将党派关系视为一种社会身份的观点。从本质上讲，党派之争就像奥巴马的经济与经济 3 下载自 https://academic.oup.com/ijpor/advance-article-abstract/doi/10.1093/ijpor/edx014/4107243 威斯康星大学麦迪逊分校用户于 0333 2018 年 5 月对某些个人（即奥巴马总统任期内的民主党人）反对种族仇恨对经济评估的影响的反补贴力量。我们认为，党派人士有动力持有确认其身份的态度，因此民主党人应该有动力对经济持积极态度，而应该激励共和党人持有消极观点（Kunda，1990；Lodge & Taber，2013；Taber & Lodge，2006）。对于（非黑人）民主党人来说，奥巴马总统代表了两个相互竞争的社会群体：一个基于党派关系的共享内群体和一个基于种族的非共享外群体。支持团体内党派的愿望应该减少基于种族的团体外敌意的影响。另一方面，共和党人缺乏团体内的党派亲和力。这导致在评估经济时更加依赖种族敌意，共和党人更多地依赖种族，民主党人更少，而独立人士则处于中间位置。除了政党认同的潜在调节作用外，我们还测试了积极的经济信息减少种族对经济信息影响的可能性。