Materialism claims that everything is physical; everything can be exhaustively described and explained in principle by physics. For over half a century challenges to materialism have focused on mental phenomena such as consciousness, reason, and value. The tacit assumption among most materialists – one shared by most of their critics – has been that more basic biological phenomena, such as metabolism and reproduction, do not pose a serious obstacle to the materialist program, that these can be easily accommodated within a materialist framework. But there is reason to think that this assumption is false. Thomas Nagel has recently argued that materialism cannot countenance biological phenomena at large. Like so many anti-materialist arguments, however, his focuses on mental phenomena. After explaining why this is a liability for him and other would-be critics of materialism, I advance an anti-materialist argument that appeals directly to biology. Materialism is false, it says, because our best empirical descriptions and explanations of biological phenomena appeal to biological organization or structure, and there is good reason to think that these appeals cannot be eliminated, reduced to, or paraphrased in favor of descriptions and explanations framed in exclusively physical terms. As a result, not everything can be described and explained exhaustively by physics. Materialism must be false. The reason, however, has nothing to do with mental phenomena specifically.

中文翻译：

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为什么唯物主义是错误的，为什么它与思想无关

唯物主义声称一切都是物质的。一切都可以用物理学原则上详尽地描述和解​​释。半个多世纪以来，对唯物主义的挑战主要集中在意识、理性和价值等心理现象上。大多数唯物主义者（他们的大多数批评者都同意这一点）的默认假设是，更基本的生物现象，例如新陈代谢和繁殖，不会对唯物主义计划构成严重障碍，这些可以很容易地适应唯物主义框架. 但是有理由认为这个假设是错误的。托马斯·内格尔（Thomas Nagel）最近提出，唯物主义不能支持整个生物现象。然而，就像许多反唯物主义的论点一样，他关注的是心理现象。在解释了为什么这对他和其他可能的唯物主义批评者来说是一种责任之后，我提出了一个直接诉诸生物学的反唯物主义论点。它说，唯物主义是错误的，因为我们对生物现象的最佳经验描述和解释诉诸于生物组织或结构，并且有充分的理由认为，这些诉求不能被消除、简化或改写为有利于框架的描述和解释仅在物理方面。因此，并非所有事物都可以用物理学详尽地描述和解​​释。唯物主义一定是假的。然而，其原因与具体的心理现象无关。因为我们对生物现象的最佳经验描述和解释诉诸于生物组织或结构，并且有充分的理由认为，这些诉求不能被消除、简化或转述以支持完全以物理术语框架的描述和解释。因此，并非所有事物都可以用物理学详尽地描述和解​​释。唯物主义一定是假的。然而，其原因与具体的心理现象无关。因为我们对生物现象的最佳经验描述和解释诉诸于生物组织或结构，并且有充分的理由认为，这些诉求不能被消除、简化或转述以支持完全以物理术语框架的描述和解释。因此，并非所有事物都可以用物理学详尽地描述和解​​释。唯物主义一定是假的。然而，其原因与具体的心理现象无关。唯物主义一定是假的。然而，其原因与具体的心理现象无关。唯物主义一定是假的。然而，其原因与具体的心理现象无关。